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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to report on how information security governance (ISG) 
arrangements are framed and shaped in practice. Our objective is to examine the extent 
to which the similarities and differences in institutional environments can subject 
organizations to multiple, competing and even contradictory arrangements for ISG. 
Using an interpretive case based research strategy we investigate how ISG 
arrangements are framed and shaped in fourteen critical infrastructure organizations in 
Australia. We explicitly recognize the socio-technical nature of ISG and draw insights 
from institutional theory. Our findings illustrate the heterogeneity and malleability of 
ISG across different organizations and highlight the need for an information centric 
view. 
Keywords: information security governance, critical infrastructure, interpretive case 
study 
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1 Introduction 
Information security governance (ISG) is increasingly recognized as a critical issue for 
organizations in terms of accountability, fiduciary duties and delivering value [ITGI 
2011]. Theft, destruction or unauthorized access to an organization’s information 
technology (IT) and information assets arising from malicious actions, inadvertent 
errors or natural or man-made disasters, may result in compromised information, serious 
system disruptions, business continuity concerns, compliance breaches, reputational 
damage, and a loss of intellectual property, strategic opportunities and shareholder 
value. Hence there has been growing recognition in the scholarly literature [Baskerville 
& Siponen 2002; Dhillon 2007; Straub, Goodman & Baskerville 2008] and the 
practitioner literature [DTT 2007; ITGI 2008] over the past decade that technical 
solutions are necessary but not sufficient in meeting information security challenges. 
This has refocused attention from viewing information security as an operational 
responsibility concerned with technical infrastructure to an enterprise-wide and strategic 
business-led responsibility placing greater emphasis on business requirements, engaging 
the right people, employing the right technology and protecting critical information 
assets [E&Y 2009; Allen & Westby 2007]. 
A number of normative standards, prescriptive frameworks and models have been 
developed to assist in governing information security however no single framework is 
recognized or used universally [ITGI 2011:30]. Whilst the challenges of ISG are 
universal in terms of protecting information assets, the way each organization responds 
may vary according to its specific context, requirements and risk tolerance levels.  
To date there has been limited empirical research directed at how the objectives of these 
standards and frameworks are actually achieved in organizations [Siponen 2006] and 
coordinated with other governance efforts. Further, greater understanding about how 
ISG is integrated in the organization and its internal and external influences is required. 
This has been identified as especially important in planning ISG audits [Love et al 
2010].  
In this paper we address these limitations and requirements and focus attention on the 
variations in arrangements for ISG. We present the findings and implications of a multi-
case study of ISG arrangements in Australian critical infrastructure organizations. Our 
choice of critical infrastructure organizations as a context for studying ISG 
arrangements is based on two key factors. First, critical infrastructure protection is of 
national significance for the Australian Government [AGD 2010] providing a rich 
empirical context. Second, at a theoretical level it provides an opportunity to examine 
multiple organizations in an organizational field based on an issue rather than a product 
or market and to investigate the institutional logics that shape ISG in practice. The 
research is especially relevant to the Bled conference theme as ISG is part of an 
organization's efforts to ensure dependability and reliability in business operations. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we discuss recent developments in 
the area of ISG and draw out a socio-technical and institutional view of ISG. We then 
present the research aims and objectives, research approach and the key research 
findings. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings for ISG and 
for enterprise information management more widely. 
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2 Changing perspectives on information security 
A review of the literature reveals two discernible but overlapping streams of research in 
the study of information security. The first (and earlier) stream is largely technical in 
perspective and is concerned with the technologies and processes for securing 
information and IT assets. A limitation of this work was a lack of focus on 
understanding the social, organizational and human aspects of information security in 
relation to these technical aspects [Straub, Goodman & Baskerville 2008; Siponen & 
Willison 2007]. This led to calls for a “socio-organizational” or “socio technical” 
perspective [Dhillon & Backhouse 2001], echoing practitioner concerns for the need to 
shift attention “from an information-technology-based, security-centric, technology- 
solution perspective to an enterprise-based, risk management, organizational continuity 
and resilience perspective” [Allen 2005:29].  
The second stream of research addresses this limitation and focuses attention on the 
need for a process oriented, strategic and organizational wide view [Straub, Goodman & 
Baskerville 2008:11, Allen 2005:11]. Hence more socially oriented studies such as 
organizational values in information security objectives [Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006], 
outsourcing [Karyda, Mitrou & Quirchmayr 2006], institutional influences of 
information security [Hu, Hart & Cook 2007], developing information security strategy 
[McFadzean, Ezingeard & Birchall 2007] and formulating policy [Baskerville & 
Siponen 2002] have been conducted. The subject matter investigated in these studies 
reveals the problematic nature of ISG, where our discussion now turns. 
2.1 Meaning and scope of ISG 
Various definitions and understandings of the term “information security governance” 
(ISG) exist in the literature. For example, the IT Governance Institute [ITGI 2006:17] 
defines ISG as a “… subset of enterprise governance that provides strategic direction, 
ensures that objectives are achieved, manages risks appropriately, uses organizational 
resources responsibly, and monitors the success or failure of the enterprise security 
programme.”  
Allen [2005:6] viewed “governing for enterprise security” (GES) as building on and 
expanding “commonly defined forms of governance” which included enterprise, 
corporate and IT governance.  
Other researchers recognize information security as a part of corporate and IT 
governance [McFadzean, Ezingeard & Birchall 2007; Von Solms 2005] or include 
aspects of governance in their discussions and categorize their work within the realm of 
information security management [Caralli 2004; Dutta & McCrohan 2002]. Thomson 
and von Solms [2005] view information security as having an overlapping function with 
corporate governance and corporate culture, adopting the term “information security 
obedience” to reflect the relationship between all three fields. 
Thus, common understandings of ISG appear to be general in scope and to combine 
information security with existing conceptions of corporate and IT governance.  
Such views provide limited insight into the relationship between information security 
and governance, assume there are similar goals and lack clarity as to the governance 
roles and responsibilities of senior management and board members with respect to 
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security concerns. Thus, the ISG literature recognizes information security as a 
governance issue. However, it is largely prescriptive, and provides limited empirical 
guidance; there remains a need to develop theory in ISG that looks beyond the newest 
“best practice” and provides contextually based understanding.  
2.2 From a technical view to a socio-technical and institutional 
perspective 
As identified above, the combining of information security with the concept of 
governance has resulted in the grouping of many heterogeneous elements without 
exploration of the interactions between these elements, raising two key issues.  
First there is a recognized need identified by scholars in the information security 
literature to widen the analytic focus from a technically centric emphasis to incorporate 
a “socio-organizational” perspective [Straub, Goodman & Baskerville 2008; Hu, Hart & 
Cook 2007]. While this perspective has drawn attention to the importance of social 
contexts broadly, it remains unclear as to what the term ‘socio’ in socio-organizational 
stands for given the diverse disciplinary spaces that examine social dynamics. For 
example Dhillon and Backhouse [2001:147] view it broadly as investigations grounded 
in the interpretive paradigm to assist understanding of the organization and social world. 
They also appear to use the term interchangeably with “socio-technical” [ibid:p.140]. 
Hu, Hart and Cooke [2007] adopted a sociological neo-institutional approach to 
highlight the influence of institutional factors on organizational actions and behaviours, 
using a positivist case study approach.The socio-organizational view conveyed in the 
literature does not give sufficient consideration to what Orlikowski and Barley 
[2001:152] describe as the “material constraints and affordances of technologies” and 
ignores how social and technical elements are linked. We argue that a socio-technical 
systems (STS) perspective may assist in bringing further clarity to the field. We view 
STS as a set of theoretical principles providing insights into the reciprocally constitutive 
nature of social and technical systems [ibid:148]. That is “human and organizational 
outcomes [can] only be understood when social, psychological, environmental and 
technological systems are assessed as a whole” [Griffith & Dougherty 2001:205]. 
Further, certain features or types of technologies may necessitate different social 
arrangements [Pinch 2008: 468]. Hence, we ground the research approach of this study 
in social constructionism ideals.  
Second, the extant literature is largely silent on how organizations actually engage with 
ISG related activities as the field is heavily populated with descriptive and prescriptive 
frameworks. From a socio-technical perspective, these normative models may be 
viewed as codified specifications that signal the arrangements and purpose of social and 
technical components and their relationship in information security. However, the role 
that such frameworks play in governing the protection of IT and information assets in 
organizations and how they manifest themselves in the way that organizations frame 
their governance arrangements remains under-explored, requiring greater empirical 
scrutiny and more contextually attuned theorizing.  
We complement the STS view with an institutional perspective, to provide further 
insights into how technologies are embedded in complex social, economic and political 
settings and consequently shaped by such institutional influences [Orlikowski & Barley 
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2001]. In particular we explore the concept of institutional logic defined as “the socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and 
rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize 
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” [Thornton & Ocasio 
2008:101]. For example information security, corporate governance and critical 
infrastructure may be viewed as three competing institutional orders which have 
different beliefs and practices that shape how individuals may engage in ISG. 
3 Research approach 
The study adopts an interpretive case study approach and is organized as follows. 
3.1 Aims and objectives 
Against the background of change in ISG outlined above and the adoption of a socio-
technical systems stance we articulate our core research question as: 
How are ISG arrangements framed and shaped in  
Australian Critical Infrastructure Organizations? 
Our aim is to examine the extent to which the similarities and differences in these 
institutional environments can subject organizations to multiple, competing and even 
contradictory arrangements for ISG. We explicitly recognize the socio-technical nature 
of ISG and in doing so we move away from the question of what ISG is, to questioning 
how ISG arrangements are shaped and institutionalized in organizations that are 
themselves embedded in complex, changing socio-technical contexts. In support of this 
core research question we organized our investigation around three distinct, but inter-
related sub-questions that assist us to understand and interpret contextual variations in 
ISG. 
RQ1:What are the drivers and scope of ISG?  
The objective of this question is to identify the range and variations in the key drivers 
and the scope or focus of ISG initiatives. 
RQ2: Who are the owners of ISG?  
The objective of this question is to establish the primary owner/responsible agency for 
ISG initiatives. 
RQ3: Where is the locus of ISG?  
The objective of this question is to establish the locus of ISG in relation to IT 
governance and corporate governance and its variation across different contexts. 
In the following section we provide an overview of the research design and data 
collection methods. 
3.2 Case study sites 
All the companies included in the sample are critical infrastructure organizations. 
Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and cyber-based systems necessary for the 
efficient operation of economies and governments. In Australia, the following sectors 
are deemed to be critical infrastructure – energy, utilities, transport, communications, 
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health, food supply, finance, government services, national icons, and manufacturing. 
To draw out contextual variations we selected organizations from a range of these 
industries and from both the public and private sectors. The resultant sample comprises 
6 private companies and 8 public companies. Specific information describing the case 
study sites and the key informants is provided in Table 1. Company names have been 
changed to maintain anonymity and to meet our research ethics protocol. 
 
 
Company Description No. of 
Employees 
Revenue Key informants 
Advantage Integrate IT and 
telecommunications carrier, 
Australian and Asia Pacific 
380 $228m CEO/Director, GM Data & 
Security, Security Practice Mgr 
(+interim Info Security Officer) 
Bank Bank – Australia  $346.4m Chief GM IT (CIO equivalent) 
Best Practice 
Co 
Retail water utility. State owned 357 $356.8m GM Finance/Company Secretary, 
CIO 
Consultant Global provider of professional 
services 
3724 (Aus) $676m 
(Aus) 
CIO Oceania 
Differentiator Information management 
company 
600 (Aus) $196.6m CFO 
Distributor Electricity transmission provider. 
State owned. 
974 $452.6m CIO 
Energy Electricity generator. State 
owned. 
363 $579m MD/Director, IT/Communications 
Mgr, Risk Mgr. 
Electrical Retail/distribution electricity 
company. State owned. 
984 $663m CEO/Director, CIO, Non-exec 
director 
Electricity Retail/distribution electricity 
company. State owned. 
2176 $1.3b GM Regulatory & Corporate 
Affairs (including IT responsibility) 
Healthy Health insurer 1100 $1.9b Group Executive (BU) (former 
CFO and acting CEO) 
Retail Gas Retail market administrator, 
virtual company. 
2 n/a CEO 
Start-up Newly formed, emergent gas 
production company 
80+ 
contractors 
$6m COO, Executive Chairman 
Water Electricity generator, State 
owned. 
870 $439.8m CEO/Director, GM Corporate 
(including IT responsibility) 
Virtual Retail market administrator, 
virtual company. 
1 n/a CEO 
Abbreviations: 
CEO: Chief Executive Officer COO: Chief Operating Officer GM: General Manager 
CIO: Chief Information Officer CFO: Chief Financial Officer MD: Managing Director 
Mgr:  Manager     
Table 1: Case sites and key informant summary 
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3.3 Data collection and data reduction 
Primary data were collected from 23 semi-structured interviews with Chief Executive 
Officers, Chief Information Officers and other senior officers, including executive and 
non-executive company directors at the 14 case study sites. All interviews were digitally 
recorded as audio files and subsequently transcribed into text files. In addition, 
secondary data comprising documents provided by the participants and publicly 
available information, contributed to the data collected. The primary aims of the 
research data analysis were to understand the cases themselves through the coding of 
the primary and secondary data to identify key themes and understand the relationships 
between them. Following Miles and Huberman [1994], a mixed data analysis approach 
comprising content analysis, thematic analysis and comparative analysis was adopted. 
This involved analyzing the data using codes and memos, reducing information via 
themes, and relating code categories. Within-case comparisons using coding techniques 
served as the basis for developing 14 individual organizational case studies, and cross-
case comparison allowed for the identification of similarities and differences between 
the sample companies. 
4 Findings 
In the following sections we present our study findings. We organize their presentation 
around the three research sub-questions: drivers and scope of ISG, ISG ownership and 
locus of ISG. 
4.1 Drivers and scope of ISG 
Three distinct drivers of ISG were identified: 1. Legislation/Cyber Threat, 2. Business 
Continuity and 3. Strategic Differentiation (Figure 1). For all cases the most significant 
driver shaping ISG initiatives is regulatory compliance and protection against cyber 
threats. 
As designated critical infrastructure organizations all the cases are subject to coercive 
regulatory pressures imposed by the Australian Federal and State governments. All 
cases have also been subject to normative pressures from institutional agents such as 
professional bodies, and/or by the existence of perceived “best practice” organizations. 
The only information security standard which has been fully adopted is ISO 17799 (now 
known as ISO 27002) by Advantage, and its Australian version AS/NZS 17799 (now 
known as AS/NZS 27002) by three other cases. The remaining cases have been guided 
by AS/NZS 7799 and have adopted various portions of this standard on a more informal 
basis, electing not to gain security certification. They also follow certain aspects of the 
COBIT and ITIL frameworks. ISG is generally driven through an amalgamation of 
other integrated processes such as risk management. Hence, other standards, such as AS 
4360 (Risk Management, now known as AS/NZS ISO 31000) and ISO 9001 (Quality 
Management) and regulations and guidelines, such as the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and 
Best Practice Recommendations have been followed. 
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Figure 1: Drivers and scope of ISG 
 
Whilst there is evidence of other drivers such as business continuity needs, customer 
imperatives and strategic differentiation, only two of the fourteen cases, Advantage and 
Differentiator have been influenced by all of these drivers. In both these cases 
information security is a core competency, as well as an operational necessity 
demonstrating a wider scope than the other cases, where the ISG focus is solely as an 
operational efficiency. Both Advantage and Differentiator have evolved and matured 
furthest toward an enhanced ISG capability, which includes a strategic and enterprise 
wide approach. 
4.2 ISG Ownership 
Two areas of ISG owenership were identified: IT executive and Business executive. The 
IT function executive retained primary responsibility in nine of the fourteen cases as 
shown in Table 2. In some instances at the Board level, there was a feeling that the 
Board members were not IT literate enough to own ISG. In these cases ISG was 
consequently delegated to the CEO; the CEO often then delegated the ownership of ISG 
to the executive responsible for IT. For the remaining five cases, the Business Executive 
for varying reasons owned ISG. For example, Start-up outsources its IT function, 
Virtual and Retail Gas are two virtual companies, and Advantage and Differentiator 
regard ‘information protection’ as a core competency. 
The use of the term information protection in the context of Advantage and 
Differentiator denotes they place a more significant emphasis on the information itself. 
The findings also highlight a different view from the widespread calls in the literature 
for more direct Board responsibility. They indicate that even though the respective 
Boards do maintain high-level oversight, Board level ISG leadership, management and 
control have been delegated to the Executive in all instances. 
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Case site 
Primary owner: 
IT function Executive 
e.g. CIO 
Primary Owner: 
Business Executive  
e.g. CEO 
Energy ✓  
Electrical ✓  
Water ✓  
Electricity ✓  
Distributor ✓  
Healthy ✓  
Start-up  ✓ 
Bank ✓  
Retail Gas  ✓ 
Consultant ✓  
Differentiator  ✓ 
Best Practice Co ✓  
Advantage  ✓ 
Virtual  ✓ 
Table 2: Summary of Primary Owners 
 
The findings also revealed the holistic nature of ISG, in all cases, all individuals within 
an organization were expected to assume some level of responsibility for ISG; 
interestingly this is an issue that is given limited attention in the academic literature. 
Futher, whilst the Executive (including IT) and Board were the key actors defining the 
organizing principles and normative roles of this function, lower levels within the 
organization, as well as extra-organizational actors such as strategic partners and 
outsourcing companies have been drawn into the tactical arenas of ISG. 
4.3 Locus of ISG 
The findings reveal that all case study organizations regard the protection of information 
across the enterprise as an important governance function and are committed to 
instituting processes to assist integration with IT governance and corporate governance. 
However, perceptions vary widely as to the locus of ISG in relation to IT governance 
and corporate governance as shown in Table 3. The results suggest that there is no 
particular dominant position with respect to the relationship of ISG to IT governance or 
corporate governance. Rather, emphasis is placed on the need for integration.  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
 
Case 
site 
 
O
utsourced IT 
function 
Inform
ation 
Security  
G
overnance 
im
plicit in IT 
G
overnance 
Inform
ation 
Security  
G
overnance 
im
plicit in 
C
orporate 
G
overnance only  
Separate 
Inform
ation  
Security 
G
overnance  
Function 
G
overnance 
Fram
ew
ork 
C
overing 
Inform
ation  
Security 
Energy ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Electricity ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Bank  ✓   ✓ 
Electrical ✓  ✓   
Water ✓  ✓   
Start-up ✓  ✓   
Retail Gas ✓  v   
Distributor ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Healthy    ✓ ✓ 
Consultant    ✓ ✓ 
Differentiator    ✓  
Best Practice Co ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Advantage    ✓ ✓ 
Virtual ✓   ✓  
Table 3: Summary of locus of ISG 
4.3.1 Information security governance implicit in IT governance  
As shown in Table 3, three organizations, Energy, Electricity and Bank, have subsumed 
their ISG initiatives within their IT governance activities (column 3), which are in turn 
overarched by corporate governance for different contextually based reasons. For 
example, Energy, a State owned corporation, is a major electricity generating 
corporation in Australia, involved in competitive trading of electricity in the National 
Electricity Market (NEM). Its major business activities are electricity production and 
energy trading. Within this company, ISG is considered a component of IT governance, 
which is in turn considered a component of the overall corporate governance. Energy’s 
institutional logic has transformed such that it now views itself as an energy trader 
rather than merely as an energy generator. This has had important ramifications in 
respect of additional security requirements, and consequently a key component of the 
company’s IT governance is now a specific ISG Framework.  
4.3.2 Information security governance implicit in corporate governance alone  
Whilst all cases required ISG to be consistent with the ethos, the principles, and the 
activities of their overall corporate governance institutions, only four of cases made it 
implicit within corporate governance alone (column 4). In these cases, no additional 
specific governance mechanisms are in place to explicitly govern information security. 
Rather, it is seen as a very central business issue. Notably, all of these organizations 
have outsourced their IT function.  
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For example, in the case of Electrical, protecting information across the enterprise is 
regarded as an important part of the IT strategy. This company is a State-owned 
electricity distribution and retail company. The company’s recent entry to the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) has caused it to re-think its governance structure and to 
reassess which committees are required to cope with its entry into the national market. 
The profile of IT within the company has also been elevated due to its recent entry to 
the NEM, and the associated major system changes to allow energy trading. No separate 
IT governance initiatives exist within the company, and there are no separate IT 
governance or ISG structures. According to a non-executive director, such governance 
is taken for granted and completely institutionalized across the organization within the 
overall corporate governance risk management process. 
In comparison, Start-up is a relatively new company still in the early stages of 
development. The company’s main activities are to explore and develop coal-bed 
methane gas fields and to produce and sell gas. Given its early development phase, it 
has very basic IT requirements. However, its ongoing connectivity to two major gas 
companies, and intellectual property associated with its unique geological and 
geophysical information necessitates that high IT security levels are maintained. At 
Board level, the company has a broad corporate governance focus, rather than an IT 
governance or ISG view specifically.  
4.3.3 Separate information security governance function 
Half of the case organizations have elected to govern information security through 
separate, nominated ISG functions, which are congruent with the respective IT 
governance and corporate governance initiatives within these organizations. They 
represent a mix of private and State organizations and vary considerably in size. Thus, 
as seen in column 5 of Table 3, half of the sample perceive ISG as a separate function in 
its own right, and five of these seven organizations, Distributor, Healthy, Consultant, 
Best Practice Co and Advantage, have instituted specific governance frameworks 
covering the protection of IT and information assets, although these are not ISG 
frameworks per se, as discussed further below. Two of the companies, Advantage and 
Differentiator, regard ISG as a strategic differentiator.  
4.3.4 Governance framework covering information security 
Eight of the 14 case organizations (column 6) have a specific governance framework of 
some kind to govern information security initiatives, whether the organizations 
undertake ISG separately in its own right, or as part of wider governance programs. 
These overarching frameworks were found to engage all organizational and operational 
processes and participants relevant to information security. For example, Energy 
governs information security via its IT Governance Framework.  Electricity governs 
information security via a broad governance framework comprising a multitude of IT, 
compliance and risk management strategies and policies.  
In only four of the cases, does an actual overarching ISG framework constitute the 
cornerstone of ISG. For example, Consultant, a global consulting firm in the financial 
sector, has in place an IT Security Framework, IT Strategy and IT Security Policy that 
underpin its ISG efforts. Advantage undertakes ISG via its IT Governance Model, Data 
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Networking and Hosting Centre Strategies, and IT Security Policy and Strategy. 
Healthy, a mutual organization that provides health insurance cover to about 2 million 
Australians, governs information security through an IT Security Governance 
Framework, which comprises an IT Security Policy, IT Security Procedures, IT Security 
Guidelines, a Password Policy, and an IT Security Tolerance Level.  
The findings reveal different orientations (for e.g. risk management emphasis versus a 
security focus) and variations in the extent to which ISG is framed as a part of or 
separate to IT and corporate governance. This highlights how the confluence of multiple 
institutional forces and technical contexts are shaping heterogeneous forms of ISG.  
5 Discussion and implications for future work 
This study set out to examine how ISG arrangements were shaped and framed in critical 
infrastructure organizations in Australia through multiple case studies. ISG was 
observed as a socio-technical, emergent and situated practice, shaped by the context in 
which it was located.  
5.1 Heterogeneous and malleable arrangements of ISG 
The study paints a picture of diverse ISG approaches in the field and shows that ISG 
arrangements vary widely, despite the evidence of some isomorphism. Conformance 
and performance objectives for ISG were not found to be universal triggers for decision 
makers but institutionally contingent. This suggests that the confluence of multiple 
institutional forces across organizations (e.g. intra-organizational relations), fields (for 
e.g. critical infrastructure), industries (e.g. energy, water, ICT) and countries (e.g. BS 
7799 and AS/NZS 17799 now 27001/27002) may result in variation and heterogeneity 
rather than homogeneous arrangements of ISG. For example, the protection of 
information was a core competency of Advantage and Differentiator and viewed as a 
strategic differentiator in contrast to the remaining cases. Further research is required to 
gain a deeper understanding of the mix of defensive, protective and enabling foci 
adopted in practice. In addition, an examination of the events leading up to and 
processes involved in the institutionalization and de-institutionalization of ISG is 
needed to progress understanding of socio-technical change surrounding ISG in 
organizations. 
5.2 Multiplicity of beliefs, norms and social logics in ISG 
At the field level organizations were formed around the issue of critical infrastructure, 
as well as in some cases, but not all, similar products and markets. However, ISG in 
each case organization was found to be a mix of laws, regulations, material practices 
and strategic imperatives. Hence a multiplicity of cultural beliefs, norms and social 
logics were found to be at play. These findings support claims in the institutional 
literature (see for e.g. [Schneiberg & Clemens 2006]) of how fragmented fields can 
subject organizations to multiple, competing and contradictory logics. Connecting the 
activities of people and organizations that are informed by and embedded in these 
multiple logics requires further research.  
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5.3 Institutional possibilities and extended governance 
Whilst the board members and senior level management have leading roles, the findings 
point to other significant actors such as outsourcing partners and lower level 
management. The ownership of ISG was not necessarily based on single autonomous 
organizations. Rather, ISG appeared to be accomplished by interactions and multilateral 
relationships within and across organizational boundaries. This suggests that single 
organizations may not be equipped to deal with the complexity associated with ISG 
requiring networked type governance arrangements with shared accountabilities. Hence 
attention needs to be directed towards not only structures but also the actions of 
individuals engaged in steering ISG. Further, the role of professional agents, standard 
setters and third party providers may provide insights into the emergence of inter-
organizational structures and political processes in developing governance arrangements 
and further progress the concept of institutional entrepreneurship. 
5.4 Need for an information centric view  
The protection of the information asset itself was identified as a core competency and 
strategic imperative in both the Advantage and Differentiator cases. Whilst it is 
commonly accepted that the goal of information security is to protect information 
assets, there is an assumption that these assets are readily identified and “there is an 
accepted understanding of what it means to protect” [ITGI 2008: 29]. Locating and 
identifying information assets, assigning value to these assets and the classification of 
information assets as to their criticality and sensitivity is recognized in practice as both a 
“daunting” yet necessary task for ISG to be “effective and relevant” [ibid: 30].  
We argue that while there has been a shift in perspective from a technology-centric to a 
socio-organizational view, there is still significant ambiguity with regard to the concept 
of information itself and call for an information centric view. Further, an information 
centric view would not only view information as an object of security but also as an 
instrument in security; recognized as a critical element in enterprise security intelligence 
enablement (ESI) [Felman 2010]. Hence more attention needs to be directed towards 
exploring the interdisciplinary terrain of information protection and probing theoretical 
ambiguities, to clarify and advance current thinking.  
The theoretical, and analytical perspective adopted in this paper provides a valuable lens 
in which to examine ISG. The extended theoretical view offered assisted in developing 
a richer theory, which revealed not only the complexity in making information security 
governable but also the problematic nature of how it is governed. We hope that the 
analysis presented in this paper may serve to stimulate further interest in ISG and the 
protection of information more broadly.  
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